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Article 2

For the Record - Media as Nomoi
Abstract

Scena. We are experiencing an explosion of recording (Ferraris 2015), which generates a proliferation of
ontological and epistemological dimensions. For instance, our life here and now and our life in the datasphere
(what we buy, when and why we were at the hospital, when we travel and with whom, etc.) today constitute
two parallel dimensions intersecting and reciprocally defining each other (Floridi 2014). There is one Dr. AC
buying milk, standing in front of a supermarket fridge on that date in that place, and there is one Dr. AC
inhabiting the web through her publications, her visiting fellowships, and in the organisation of events, plus
there is a patient, a mother, a daughter, etc. (the list made by John Searle is usually pretty long and contains all
the functions we can have in the social world): the more that is recorded, the more can be traced back, and the
more what we appear to be depends on how easily a datum can be found, iterated, re-interpreted. Technology,
more than ever, is permanently producing and filling in a universal - almost infinite - archive, where
information, transactions, communications (emails, telephone conversations, chats), intentions, mistakes and
various other forms of human existence and traceability are contained.
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1 Theme and Vocabulary
Scena. We are experiencing an explosion of recording (Ferraris 2015),
which generates a proliferation of ontological and epistemological
dimensions. For instance, our life here and now and our life in the
datasphere (what we buy, when and why we were at the hospital,
when we travel and with whom, etc.) today constitute two parallel
dimensions intersecting and reciprocally defining each other (Floridi
2014). There is one Dr. AC buying milk, standing in front of a
supermarket fridge on that date in that place, and there is one Dr. AC
inhabiting the web through her publications, her visiting fellowships,
and in the organisation of events, plus there is a patient, a mother, a
daughter, etc. (the list made by John Searle is usually pretty long and
contains all the functions we can have in the social world): the more
that is recorded, the more can be traced back, and the more what we
appear to be depends on how easily a datum can be found, iterated,
re-interpreted. Technology, more than ever, is permanently producing
and filling in a universal - almost infinite - archive, where information,
transactions, communications (emails, telephone conversations, chats),
intentions, mistakes and various other forms of human existence and
traceability are contained.1 Usually, this explosion of recording is
considered as the reason for a great revolution in the field of privacy
Law Text Culture Vol 22 2018 00
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and thus in the definition of the difference between the private and the
public dimension of human life. I shall try to add another perspective
on this, which I consider crucial for legal discourse: indeed, I shall
address this great transformation, following the most recent works of
Maurizio Ferraris (who elaborates on Derrida’s philosophy of traces
and archi-writing), from the perspective of the responsibility produced
by these huge, universal and almost infinite archives. That is to say,
I will try to show that, first, without technology there would be no
normativity; and, second, that technology itself has its own capacity to
produce responsibilities and obligations. New media certainly convey
information through recordings - for this reason, though they are
usually referred to as IT, information technology, Maurizio Ferraris
insists on the fundamental function of recordings in the way new
technologies influence our life. What matters is not, in other words,
the fact that data, emails or online transactions contain information
that could (and often is) used otherwise; what matters is, instead, that
all this remains, and keeps existing (as a kind of data-storage) because
it is traced down on devices that are constructed as archives. In 1967,
Derrida had foreseen the ‘end of books’ as means of communication
and of preservation of knowledge; yet, at the same time, he had
foreseen a new explosion of writing: his view was certainly prophetic
to this extent, since computers, the web and the contemporary universe
of communication constitute a mainly written dimension, in which the
devices of recording multiply and in which, thus, traces proliferate also
independently of the will or intentions of individual subjects (Ferraris
2011: 15; Ferraris 2015, 2018).

Proscenium. There are a number of key-concepts often occurring
in the earlier as well as in contemporary ref lections on how a
grammatological view of the world could inf luence a different
perspective on how we perceive language, communication and
normativity. The meaning of these concepts must be deconstructed
in order to be re-used today: (a) nomos, a word that means ‘law’ or
‘custom’. The word originally translated the concept of law in ancient
Greeek thought. Currently, ‘norm’ indicates a proposition that contains
an obligation. (b) Grammata: signs, traces: that which is written, that
6
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which is drawn and traced down. (c) Inscriptio: from in plus scribere. To
write in or to write on something. (d) Record: the act of repeating, or
to reiterate; rehearse, repeat and report by heart. From Latin recordari:
remember, call to mind, think over, be mindful of. Integration of
re-, restore and cor (genitive cordis), heart - as the metaphoric seat of
memory. (e) Technologìa: a word composed by the terms ‘tèchne’, that
means art or technique, a way of making things and/or the knowledge
about how to make things; and logìa, deriving from logos: discourse,
treaty (itself deriving from lego, which means speaking, describing).
The composition of these two terms into technologìa indicates a doctrine
of how to apply the rules, the knowledge about how to make things.

Through a progression going from the trace, to the document, and
finally to the archive, the ambivalence and double bind between presence
and absence is the underlying theme characterizing both Derrida’s theory
of grammatology and of the force of law, on the one hand, and Maurizio
Ferraris’s works on new technologies and mobilisation , on the other. In
both philosophical systems (as in Plato’s Phaedrus), the act of writing
is aimed at inscribing something that otherwise would disappear:
recording guarantees the possibility of presence and preserves the
temporality of an event, of an act, of a contingent proposition beyond
its contingency. Writing is first and foremost a technique, a tèchne, an
ars: a procedure that implies the capacity of crafting something that
is not there and of extending the duration of a contingent act or fact
beyond its contingency. Inasmuch as the archive, as Goodrich recalls in
his paper, 2 ‘attempts an accurate description of what did not occur’
(Goodrich 2018), Phaedrus (the protagonist of the Platonic dialogue)
needs the written version of the discourses he has heard (which he hides
under his cloak) since he is afraid of forgetting them; similarly, we are all
obsessed with being present: to the extent that new technologies allow
us to be everywhere at anytime precisely because we are afraid of being
absent, here and now and also there and then, and more generally since
we are afraid of death. Cornelia Vismann wrote that the archive refers
to that which does not speak and keeps what otherwise would get lost
(Vismann 2008); in a similar way, a norm contained in the text of a
law is a norm that otherwise would not exist as norm and would not be
7
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respected. Inscriptions stand to make things enduring and contextually
remind us that otherwise things (norms, messages, orders, love letters)
would be ephemeral. Because that is what they are: ephemeral. Just
like life itself. No wonder that the philosopher of textuality, traces and
grammatology par excellence was afraid of death (Ferraris 2011). Nomoi
must be inscribed, codified, in order to exist and persist as such. Thus,
the whole history of juridical normativity is a history of codification,
of transcription of intentions on a limited piece of material that could
be found, interpreted and accessed.

Today’s technological revolution thus amplifies an archaic drive:
tracing down not to forget. It also shows that such a drive is ambivalent:
for something to exist, there must be trace of it; once it is traced down,
the device on which it is inscribed also informs the way it circulates
and it is understood.
A Circularities
Ambivalence is thus a crucial characteristic of writing. A proposition
stands there to remind us that otherwise we would forget its content.
A law indicates that otherwise our behaviour would not follow the
normative content of a certain proposition, that we follow just because
it is law (Derrida 1992). The ambivalence of writing and its double
bind with memory and forgetting, thus, resembles the ambivalence
of the juridical pharmakon, which stands to remind us that – if it was
not there – we would need it. In both double binds, the relationship
between presence and absence is the engine, the force that moves the
dynamic. The double and ambivalent relationships between writing
and its content, and between the law and its content, involve a circular
movement. The ambivalence (the sign is necessary but then it ends
up hiding something or meaning something else) is related to the
instrument which records and preserves the content.
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Figure 1. Circular movement in which the three poles, nomos, grammata
and technology, interact.

We can understand the ambivalence better by imagining a circular
movement in which three poles interact (see Figure 1).
Pole one. Nomos - Grammata. In order for something to exist
socially and to produce consequences, it must be inscribed. This is
true in particular in the legal realm, as Derrida noted (Derrida 1992).
Following the principle that nothing exists outside of the text, Derrida
notoriously analysed the English expression ‘to enforce the law’. When
talking about this expression, Derrida claims, one:
loses the direct or literal allusion to the force that comes from within
to remind us that law is always an authorised force, a force that justifies
itself or is justified in applying itself, even if this justification may be
judged from elsewhere to be unjust or unjustifiable. Applicability,
or what we term 'enforceability', is not an exterior or secondary
possibility that may or may not be added 'as a supplement to law'
(Derrida 1992: 5).

Pole two. Grammata - Technology. Signs, traces, documents and
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archives do not float in the atmosphere. The materiality of the traces is
crucial: without it, the trace would only be a mere sign. A determined
material life on a determined type of device (for instance, a code that
contains laws) attributes to the sign the status of a qualified trace,
capable of producing consequences. The technology plays a central
role because without it, there would be no inscription and thus no
normative force. Ferraris explains it clearly (Ferraris 2009; 2015),
first in his work on documentality, then in his more recent work on
documediality. He writes:
The documedial revolution is a technological, social and anthropological
revolution. It has indeed been possible thanks to the constructive
force of documentality in conjunction with the communicative and
mobilizing power of the web. It is a connection of documents and
media that has involved a very large number of people, in a completely
unexpected way. Therefore, it is anthropological because it directly
concerns human beings, modifies their lifestyle in more than one way
and at the same time highlights some essential human characteristics;
it is social because it is given in the social world at the base of which
there is documentality; it is technological because it is triggered by
the strength and peculiarity of the web (Ferraris and Martino 2018)3.

Ferraris bases his claims on documentality, at first, and on
documediality, more recently (after the explosion of the web and of
technology 4.0), on two strong theses: i. social reality is constituted
by recording, and what is not recorded does not exist; ii. recording
is normative. As a matter of fact, traces produce responsibility: once
I know a message has been sent, or once I know I have received a
message, either I expect the receiver to respond or I know that the
sender might expect a response. In both cases and directions, the trace
of the communication contains a question/an order/a proposition and
thus it produces a form of responsibility between sender and receiver.
By following this line of reasoning, Ferraris develops his theory on
(what he defines as) Derrida’s ‘anxious ontology’ (Ferraris 2011: 17):
in other words, an ontology characterised by the human fear of being
forgotten, of missing the traces of what has been, and which has
notoriously translated into grammatology.
10

For the Record
Media as Nomoi

Pole Three. Technology - Nomos. Against this background, the
relationship between technology and normativity becomes clearer. The
recording makes it possible for the norm to be read, seen, understood,
received - thus, it is necessary for its existence. For it to exist, it must
be inscribed (codified). Once traced down, once inscribed and codified,
then, one cannot claim that it was impossibile to have access to that
norm - thus the inscription makes it an obligation. As Derrida writes,
we do not obey it because it is just or unjust, but because it is written
down as a norm.

This circular movement (from nomos to grammata/inscription, from
grammata to technology, from technology to nomos and back) is the
background movement that makes law enforceable: thus, the nature of
law as law appears to be intrinsically connected to its materiality. The
gap between the materiality and the value attributed to it (this différance,
to say it in Derridean terms) produces what in physics is defined
‘potential’: an unrealised ability, which could be realised or is about
to be realised (but could also remain just a potential). This potential
displaces all oppositional logics and opens a dynamic perspective on
normativity, in which nomoi, grammata, codices as recording technologies
constantly define each other. Actually, this circularity shows that the
very sense of the law lies in its inscription: Derrida’s main thesis in the
Mystical Foundation of Authority (1992: 6) is that the enforceability of
law shows how ‘there is no such thing as law (droit) that doesn’t imply
in itself, a priori, in the analytic structure of its concept, the possibility
of being “enforced”, applied by force’. And what enforces the law is
precisely its materiality. So it is very interesting that, decades later,
and within the explosion of recording (just think of smartphones, the
web, big data), a disciple of Derrida (Ferraris) engages in a philosophy
of actuality starting from the normative force of new technologies which, as he says, have the power to make us feel obliged like a formal
norm written down on a text.
This is how his article on total mobilisation (Ferraris 2014) begins:

It is the night between Saturday and Sunday, the night that is
traditionally consecrated to rest. In the dead of night, I wake up. I
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want to see what time it is and I obviously check it on the cell phone,
which tells me that it is three o’ clock. But, at the same time, I notice
that someone has sent me an email. I cannot resist the curiosity, or
better the anxiety, (the mail concerns a matter of work), and that’s it: I
read it and reply. I am suddenly working on Saturday night, no matter
where I am. The Internet is an empire on which the sun never sets,
and having a smartphone in your pocket means having the world in
your hand, but it also automatically means being in the hands of the
world: at all times a request can reach us, and at all times we will be
responsible for dealing with it.

The possibility of recording makes it possible to realise something
which was unbelievable until recently (communicating with a colleague
who lives on the other side of the planet, as if she was there in front
of us); yet, the technology that makes this communication possible
produces a bond between those two subjects and potentially all the
other subjects that could use similar instruments of mobilisation. Just
like the double value of law as an authorised force (Gewalt) that always
needs to be justified (Derrida 1992), the act of writing and recording has
to do with justification, on the one hand, and simultaneously produces
consequences, on the other hand. Similarly, the medium - the email,
or chat, which is mainly characterised by recording - reproduces the
double bind between dike and adikia, i.e. between what is just and
what is unjust.

The double movement between absence and presence is also the
theme of the opening pages of Giorgio Agamben’s book The Fire
and the Tale (2017: 1ff), where he engages with literary historigraphy
starting from an old anecdote found in a book on Jewish mysticism.
Here is what the story tells. There was, once, Baal Schem, the founder
of Hasidism. Each time he had a difficult task to face and resolve, he
would go to the woods, in a specific place; he would then light a fire
and meditate in prayer, and what he had set out to perform was done
(Agamben 2017: 1). A generation later, the Maggid of Meseritz had to
face the same task: he went again to that specific place in the woods,
saying ‘we can no longer light a fire, but we can pray’; and, again, what
he had set out to perform was done and everything he wanted, finally
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happened. Then, another generation passed, and Rabbi Moshe Leib of
Sassov had to face a task. He said: ‘We can no longer light a fire, nor
do we know the secret meditations belonging to the prayers, but we
know the place in the woods, and that can be sufficient’. And in fact it
was sufficient. But, then, another generation passed and Rabbi Israel
of Rishin was asked to performed the task. He finally said that they
could no longer light the fire, they could not speak the prayers, they
did not know the place, but they could still tell the story of all that.
And, again, it was sufficient.
The short story talks about the function of literature and narrative:
historically we have moved further from the sources of our knowledge,
from the original sources of law. What remains of all the mysteries that
are no longer traced is literature, narration, narratives and that - the
Rabbi comments - can be enough. ‘We can tell the story of this’, is
what the last Rabbi says: by saying so, he means exactly the opposite.
‘All this’ is an undetermined sea of signs where all knowledge depends
on the story.

Derrida was obsessed with a similar loss of the fire, of the signs,
and thus he suggested paying attention to all signs and to consider
all the world within the text, the documents, and archives; Ferraris
adds, to this, that grammatology has a cost. If traces remain, and
if we make it possible for them to remain eternally and to be found
anytime and anywhere, thus they become sources of obligation. Like
the Platonic pharmakon, presence and absence are linked together and
define each other. Interestingly, the allegory of the fire and the tale
talks about oral and written culture, which again, as in all Derridean
grammatology, suggests something relevant for legal discourse: that all
normative culture should be reconsidered in light of the technological
transformation we are experiencing.
2 Materia of the nomoi
The double bind linking the presence and the absence of traces on
technological devices invites a redefinition of what is ‘normative’.
If there is no law without enforceability, and no applicability or
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enforceability of the law without a justification of the use of force
(which can only derive from an inscription), then the material life of
norms is a fundative part of norms themselves. The constitution, or
inscription, of a legal norm as law is a matter of différance - i.e., in
Derridean terms, of the relation ‘between force and form, between force
and signification, performative force, illocutionary or perlocutionary
force, of persuasive and rhetorical force, of affirmation by signature’
(Derrida 1992: 7). For Derrida, the act of inscription is the origin of all
meaning, persistence, and value:
For me, it is always a question of differential force, of difference as
difference of force, of force as différance (différance is a force differéedifférante), of the relation between force and form, between force and
signification, performative force, illocutionary or perlocutionary force,
of persuasive and rhetorical force, of affirmation by signature, but also
and especially of all the paradoxical situations in which the greatest
force and the greatest weakness strangely enough exchange places.

By linking dishomogeneous objects - force and form, presence and
absence - and by showing their reciprocal coexistence, différance, as
aforementioned, displaces all typically oppositional logic and makes
it necessary to rethink the rigid categories that had led to thinking
of ontology as the mere, solid, reality standing in front of us, and of
epistemology as a transcendental dimension where concepts fluctuate
without any hold on the world.

Technology, this is another intuition that we owe to Ferraris (2018),
connects these two dimensions - ontology and epistemology - and
inhabits that differential space that for Derrida was constituted mainly
by textuality and for Ferraris is constituted both by textuality and by
the technological devices where signs, traces, texts, words are deposited.
The recording is where the norm is present: it is written down and thus
it exists and it remains valid through the sign. Its inscription constitutes
its presence: it is there, and it is valid, because of its material definition
through the recording - be it in a code (in the case of a law), or on an
electronic device (in the case of data transmitted on informatic devices).
The act of writing down the norm represents something that otherwise
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would not exist. Normative language needs to be traced down, or it
would be impossible to know or understand its content; the act of tracing
down the content of the norm is, at the same time, an act of hiding the
norm behind those words. This inscription, or recording, is necessary:
without it, there would be only a fluctuating content of a norm that
does not exist outside of the mind of the person who has imagined it.

As Peter Goodrich noted in Languages of Law, our memory is
narrational, and:
[T]he law maps that narrative in a story of origins or of the sources
from which the law comes, precedent being nothing other than the
cartography of that elastic temporal expanse between the beginning
and end of a story, between the emergence and the conclusion, between
the exordium and the peroration (1990: 36).

If we try to link this original drive, or need, for origins, to the
arché that justifies and explains the reasons of everything, then the
fundamental importance played by technology today emerges even
more quickly. How messages are transmitted, deposited, found: all the
material life of the legal files, already described in the wonderful work
of Cornelia Vismann, is now expanding and proliferating. If, on the
one hand, logic gives order and structure to legal narrative, legal norms
on the other hand need a justification to be legitimated. Goodrich
writes (1990: 39) ‘the connective principle, already adverted to, is not,
however, simply one of visual recollection or remembering. It is more
than that; it relies upon a first cause, an origin whose presence is to be
traced throughout the argument.’ The questions that emerge concern the
material life of laws and obligations - that could emerge, for instance,
from a tweet: indeed, a tweet creates a link between one person and
a community, and it thus constitutes a whole world of expectations,
responsibilities, questions and answers. Again, it is Goodrich who,
while discussing the lingustic roots of the common law, claimed that
jurists should pay more attention to:
[H]ow are these texts produced, where are these texts kept, by whom
are they used, how do they move or circulate, who receives them,
who interprets them, who would understand them, whose office is
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it to understand and to send on that understanding, to transmit that
custody? (Goodrich 1990: 113).

Bringing legal theory back to the technologies of law is now
recognised as a necessary gesture by many legal scholars. The issue
that we must consider is the technology or mode of production of
law, or more generally of norms. Such a grammatological - or, today,
documedia - analysis of law touches upon legal rhetoric as well, this
last understood not only as a mechanism to win a case, but also as an
ars, a tèchne, a know-how: in its original meaning, tèchne meant both
knowledge (epistemology) and the art of making, of being in the world
(which relates to ontology). That is exactly where technology stands: in
between those two dimensions. The technology of the law is memory,
as archives and files show:
[L]egal writing was a ritual system of inscriptions. The text was
necessarily true; […] It was a language not of speech but of memory, of
memorials and of monuments addressed not so much to any immediate
audience as to posterity and to God’ (Goodrich 1990: 139).

A Decentralized, Autonomous, Impersonal. New
Technologies of Normativity
In her book Files (2008) Corniela Vismann showed how files (Akten)
are the basic variables in the universes of writing and of the law: they
proliferate, they mushroom. Files are recording devices that register
everything in the medium of writing, also that which is not writing:
Files are comprehensive recording devices that register everything in
the medium of writing, even that which is not writing. They register
events, voices, gestures, and appearances. It is not until the twentieth
century, when competition arises in the shape of the analog recording
of events by technological media, that the inaccuracy of written files
becomes apparent. From then on, these new technologies set the
standard for recording accuracy and promote the linguistic analysis
of the loss that accompanies the conversion of speech into files. It is
not until linguistic pragmatics provides the appropriate framework
(Vismann 2008: 10).
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This was before the big data, and before the use of artificial
intelligence in legal practice: Vismann already recognized the diffuse
ignorance of legal scholars towards the sources and the instruments
of the practices at the core of their work. As if a reflection on the tools
was intellectually less exciting than a reflection on the concepts and
on the juridical issues. The current technological revolution has even
amplified the presence of files of all sorts; following Ferraris, we could
distinguish between files or documents in a strong sense - and files
or documents in a weak sense. In a strong sense, a file contains the
intentions of one or more subjects. For instance, a contract is a file in a
strong sense. The trace of an event, or the sign of a communication, is a
document or file in a weak sense (according to Ferraris’ distinction).
Vismann argued for a similar distinction:
Documents or certificates differ conspicuously from records by their
representative use of writing. They are not designed for any particular
administrative use; rather, they are made to impress. Their letters are
signs of power; their very appearance represents the authority of the
issuer. The layout of a document is a ‘gesture of power’. Disregarding
all aesthetic concerns related to typeface, page format, and placement
of letters, it is the prestigiousness of the signs alone that determines
the size and arrangement of the letters on a document (2008: 72).

Vismann focuses on the ambivalent nature of the German term
‘Akten’, which indicates both the written text, and whatever inscribed
trace - and the devices to archive the texts: Akten are both the single
instances (of documents, traces, etc) and the spaces of their collection
as Akten. I shall summarise the main transformations occuring in the
present time in three main points/characteristics: i. decentralisation
and distribution of archives (and thus of documents and of the traces
within); ii. absence of state authority, autonomy; iii. unmodifiable
nature of the traces, since they also proliferate from each other and do
not derive (or not always) from the action of a subject.

As to i. (decentralisation and distribution), registers - for instance
those that work through blockchains - have copies of the data: this
means that nobody can say that he or she has the exclusive and unique
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copy of a document, since the archive is everywhere and anyone who
has access to it. In a certain way, contemporary archives have realised
the fantasy represented in Italo Calvino’s The memory of the world, a
short story written in 1963, in which all the information about each
individual, place, city, event, relationship was contained within one,
gigantic, universal archive (interestingly enough, by the way, the
narrator says in a dialogue that the gigantic and universal archive had
been built because humanity was afraid to be forgotten, a fear familiar
to Derrida’s obsession with textuality). We currently have the equivalent
of many NSA Towers, all distributed around the world into archives
that are apparently immaterial (but that consist of infinite traces, that
produce more and new traces).

As to ii. (autonomy and absence of authority), a good exemplification
is offered by blockchains (the intrument used for the bitcoin monetary
circuits): there is no subject to verify the operation, but an algorythm
controls and calculates all the operations of the transaction. There is
no authority to check the transactions, which appear to be much more
accessible by everyone, everywhere, anytime.

As to iii. (traces cannot be easily modified), each transaction made
through these distributed registers (such as blockchains) can only be
modified by a counter-operation. Data, once inscribed, gain a life of
their own.

The philosophical concept of documediality ties in well with
Vismann’s work in particular because it invites a reflection on the
apparent antinomy between the norms of law as classically defined
and the norms understood as legal ‘remediation’. The circulation of law
changes as well with the current technological revolution, showing a
certain archetypical (virtual) nomos, counterposed to the confines of the
traditional archive or library. The opposition invites to recall Vismann’s
example of lead rolls whose principal significance was their gravity,
their weight, their perdurance, the fact that something was there and
defined a space, a confinement in the library or archive, currently
counterposed to the free play, evanescence and unbearable lightness
of clips and tweets and hastags.
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In conclusion, as Mark Antaki rightly recalls in his dialogue with
Richard Janda, Hannah Arendt has developed an idea of a ‘negative
solidarity’ as a characteristic of humanity, forged by technology and
tied to humanity’s capacity to destroy itself. And to destroy itself by
looking, potentially, for a better living, or for an easier one. Through
these elaborations on Derrida and Ferraris, hopefully, the ambivalence
of technology has re-emerged as some sort of fil rouge that has
accompanied human history since antiquity. The artificial normativity
of the law, as a matter of fact, grows parallel to the other systems of
laws, first of all those of the world outside and before the law. On top
of such an already complex normative universe, norms - in order to be
enforceable and to be valid - need to be inscribed. And this explosion of
inscription has transformed the Panopticon into a system of reciprocal
observation of everyone, everywhere, anytime. Technology preserves
and deposits traces on top of an already complicated thread of natural
norms and social norms.
Notes
1. See Maurizio Ferraris’ chapter in the present volume for specific aspects
of the current technological transformation, in order to understand what
he means when referring to the current ontological and epistemological
revolution.
2. In the present volume: Heretical Archives: pp. 53 ff.
3. In the present volume: pp. 21 ff.
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